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Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue 
Burden Preemption 
Caitlin E. Borgmann∗ 
Abstract 
This Article discusses the tendency of some lower federal 
courts to interpret the undue burden standard of Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey as essentially 
occupying the field of potential constitutional claims whenever 
abortion is involved. Thus, where litigants have alleged 
constitutional claims other than, or in addition to, undue burden 
violations, courts have either changed how they normally analyze 
these constitutional claims or they have even completely foreclosed 
the application of other doctrines on the grounds that the undue 
burden standard subsumes or displaces these claims. This Article 
illustrates this phenomenon in the context of three types of non-
undue-burden claims that have been asserted against some 
abortion restrictions: bodily integrity, equal protection, and the 
right against compelled speech. Undue burden preemption, I 
argue, flies in the face of the Court’s recognition that “[c]ertain 
wrongs . . . can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s 
commands.”1 Where multiple constitutional violations are alleged, 
the Court’s normal approach is to examine each constitutional 
provision in turn. There is one well-established exception to this 
general rule, the “Graham doctrine.” This doctrine provides that, 
when a litigant asserts a substantive due process claim, and where 
the Court finds that another more specific constitutional provision 
applies, the Court analyzes the claim under the more specific 
provision to the exclusion of substantive due process. This Article 
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 1. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992). 
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argues that undue burden preemption, far from being justified by 
the Graham doctrine, turns that doctrine on its head. 
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I. Introduction 
“Abortion exceptionalism” is a term that has been used to 
describe the tendency of legislatures and courts to subject 
abortion to unique, and uniquely burdensome, rules.2 This Article 
addresses a particular kind of abortion exceptionalism, which I 
call “undue burden preemption.” Undue burden preemption is a 
trend in which some lower federal courts interpret the undue 
burden standard as essentially occupying the field of potential 
constitutional claims that may be brought against a given 
abortion restriction.3 Under undue burden preemption, courts 
                                                                                                     
 2. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortion, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1175, 1177 (2014) (describing abortion exceptionalism as courts’ failure to 
apply “normal doctrine” when abortion is at issue); Ian Vandelwalker, Abortion 
and Informed Consent, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012) (describing abortion 
exceptionalism as singling “abortion . . . out for more restrictive government 
regulation as compared to other, similar procedures”). Abortion rights opponents 
have used the term in the opposite sense, to suggest that courts have unfairly 
privileged abortion over competing constitutional rights. See “Abortion 
Exceptionalism” to be Reviewed by U.S. Supreme Court, LIFE LEGAL DEF. FOUND. 
(Sept. 12, 2013), http://lldf.org/abortion-exceptionalism-to-be-reviewed-by-u-s-
supreme-court/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (describing abortion exceptionalism 
as “the idea that abortion clinics somehow deserve special treatment in the free 
speech context”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See infra Part III (discussing examples of undue burden preemption). 
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addressing the constitutionality of abortion restrictions either 
refuse to analyze claims other than undue burden claims on the 
grounds that the undue burden standard displaces the other 
claims, or they interpret the undue burden standard as 
supplanting or altering the normal doctrine applied to the 
separate claims.4 Undue burden preemption is an aberration in 
constitutional adjudication. Normally, when a litigant alleges 
that a particular governmental action violates multiple 
constitutional rights, the courts analyze each alleged violation 
separately under the relevant doctrine.5  
The only area in which the United States Supreme Court has 
allowed a particular constitutional claim to “preempt” another 
separate claim is that of substantive due process. Under the 
“Graham doctrine,” as it is known, when a litigant asserts a 
substantive due process claim, and where the Court finds that 
another more specific constitutional provision applies (for 
instance, the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures), the Court analyzes the claim under the 
more specific provision to the exclusion of substantive due 
process.6 Undue burden preemption is the opposite of the 
Graham doctrine. Whereas the Graham doctrine prefers a more 
specific constitutional claim to a more general one, undue burden 
preemption rejects, or waters down, more specific constitutional 
claims (or, in the case of bodily integrity, an equally nonspecific 
constitutional claim) in favor of the notoriously nonspecific undue 
burden standard.7 Thus, under Graham, undue burden 
preemption is still jurisprudentially indefensible. 
This Article is organized into three parts. Part II describes 
the prevailing approach to adjudicating constitutional claims, 
along with the single established exception to this approach, the 
Graham doctrine. Part III explains the concept of undue burden 
preemption, illustrating its use in three doctrinal contexts: bodily 
integrity, equal protection, and free speech. Part IV critiques 
undue burden preemption as a misguided and dangerous 
                                                                                                     
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part III (discussing the prevailing approach).  
 6. See infra notes 25–31 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine 
established in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). 
 7. See infra Part III (discussing undue burden preemption). 
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expansion of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey’s8 undue burden standard, one that turns the Graham 
doctrine on its head. 
 
II. The Prevailing Approach 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a particular 
governmental act can implicate more than one constitutional 
right.9 When this is the case, claimants can assert multiple 
constitutional claims, and courts will consider each in turn, 
applying the relevant constitutional doctrine to each claim 
separately.10 The Court has expressly acknowledged this 
prevailing approach on more than one occasion. In United States 
v. James Daniel Good Real Property,11 the Court addressed 
whether the government’s seizure of the claimant’s property 
without prior notice and a hearing violated procedural due 
process.12 The Government argued that it need only comply with 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.13 The Court agreed 
that the Fourth Amendment applied to the seizure but declared 
that this was not the “sole constitutional provision in question.”14 
The Court explained: “We have rejected the view that the 
applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the 
guarantees of another.”15 The Court in Good Real Property relied 
upon Soldal v. Cook County,16 a property seizure case in which 
the Court had made the identical point.17 In Soldal, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 9. See Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992) (“Certain wrongs affect 
more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the 
Constitution’s commands.”). 
 10. See id. (“Where . . . multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the 
habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim’s ‘dominant’ character. 
Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn.”). 
 11. 510 U.S. 43 (1993). 
 12. Id. at 46. 
 13. Id. at 49. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 506 U.S. 56 (1992). 
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stated: “Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, 
accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s 
commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are 
not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim’s 
‘dominant’ character. Rather, we examine each constitutional 
provision in turn.”18 
The Court’s recognition of the prevailing approach in Good 
Real Property and Soldal merely makes explicit what courts have 
always done. Courts routinely address, seriatim, different 
constitutional claims addressing the same governmental action. 
They do not construe one applicable constitutional provision to 
preempt another, nor do they force claimants to litigate solely 
under the doctrine of the Court’s choice. In Doe v. Bolton,19 for 
example, the Supreme Court considered claims that various 
Georgia abortion restrictions violated not only the right to 
privacy but also procedural due process, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, and equal protection.20 The Ninth Circuit in a 
recent case addressing a sex offender registration law separately 
considered, and analyzed under the respective doctrines, claims 
that the law violated the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto 
Clauses; procedural due process; and the Contract Clause.21  
                                                                                                     
 17. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49–50 
(1993) (relying on Soldal to support the fact that the Court “ha[s] rejected the 
view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the 
guarantees of another”); see also Soldal, 506 U.S. at 60 (noting that the Court 
“granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals’ 
trailer home implicated their Fourth Amendment rights”).  
 18. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 60; see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 287 
(1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court has previously 
rejected the proposition that the Constitution’s application to a general 
subject . . . is necessarily exhausted by protection under particular textual 
guarantees addressing specific events within that subject . . . , on a theory that 
one specific constitutional provision can pre-empt a broad field as against 
another more general one.”). 
 19. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 20. See id. at 195–96, 200–01 (discussing whether appellant was deprived 
of procedural due process as a result of lack of access to hospital despite being 
pregnant and whether Georgia’s residency requirements violated the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause or equal protection provisions of the U.S. Constitution). 
 21. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1052–61 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
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There is one well-established—if not exactly well-known22—
exception to this general rule. This exception applies when a 
substantive due process claim is asserted. Under the exception, 
the Court applies other constitutional provisions to the exclusion 
of substantive due process where it finds that the other 
provisions supply an “explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection.”23 This exception is known as the “Graham doctrine,” 
from one of the early cases to announce the doctrine, Graham v. 
Connor.24 In Graham, the Court held that claims of excessive 
force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop must be 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, rather under than the 
“more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process.’”25 While 
Graham could be interpreted as applying only to excessive force 
cases, or perhaps to the Fourth Amendment context more 
generally,26 the Court has more recently applied the doctrine to 
the Takings Clause27 and to the Eighth Amendment.28 It has 
suggested in dicta that it applies to the Fifth Amendment Self-
                                                                                                     
 22. Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot” 
Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1088 (1998) 
(describing the Graham doctrine as a “little known corner of due process law”).  
 23. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). 
 24. 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see also id. at 395 (“[We] hold that all claims that 
law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . should be analyzed under 
the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a 
‘substantive due process’ approach.”); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 
(1975) (holding that “The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the 
criminal justice system,” and therefore the Fourth Amendment, rather than the 
Due Process Clause, is more appropriate for determining proceedings required 
after criminal arrests). 
 25. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
 26. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 273–75 (applying Graham doctrine to Fourth 
Amendment malicious prosecution claim). 
 27. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
560 U.S. 702, 721 (2010) (“The first problem with using Substantive Due Process 
to do the work of the Takings Clause is that we have held it cannot be done.”). 
But see Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A 
Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1002–05 (2000) (discussing and criticizing the 
application of the Graham doctrine in the context of property takings). 
 28. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“Graham 
simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific 
constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim 
must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not 
under the rubric of substantive due process.”). 
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Incrimination Clause as well.29 Some lower federal courts have 
interpreted Graham as establishing the general principle that 
whenever another amendment provides “an explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection,”30 that provision must be 
applied to the exclusion of substantive due process.31  
It is important to recognize that Graham—whatever its 
scope—displaces substantive due process claims only, and then 
only when an express textual provision is applicable. The 
apparent underlying premise of the Graham doctrine is that 
substantive due process is murky, lacks clear guideposts, and 
addresses unenumerated rights.32 Therefore, if the Court has 
explicit constitutional text to apply, it prefers to do so.33 The 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 n.5 (2003) (“If . . . the Fifth 
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause governs coercive police interrogation 
even absent use of compelled statements in a criminal case, then Graham 
suggests that the Due Process Clause would not.”). 
 30. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 31. See, e.g., Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 485–86 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing 
to apply a due process or equal protection standard to cases challenging the 
proportionality of sentences because “[t]he Eighth Amendment explicitly 
addresses the constitutionality of punishments”), overruled on other grounds by 
Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2004); Armendariz v. Penman, 
75 F.3d 1311, 1325–26 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that, “[s]ince Sinaloa, the 
Supreme Court has made clear what was implicit in Graham,” that 
“[s]ubstantive due process analysis has no place in contexts already addressed 
by explicit textual provisions of constitutional protection, regardless of whether 
the plaintiff’s potential claims under those amendments have merit”), overruled 
in part by Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855–56 
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding that “the Fifth Amendment would preclude a due 
process challenge only if the alleged conduct is actually covered by [the 
Amendment]” and “it is no longer possible . . . to read Armendariz as imposing a 
blanket obstacle to all substantive due process challenges to land use 
regulation”). The Supreme Court itself has not consistently applied Graham this 
broadly, however. See Massaro, supra note 22, at 1108–09, 1113 n.132 (pointing 
out that the Supreme Court has not extended the Graham doctrine to Takings 
Clause cases or in some criminal procedure contexts). 
 32. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (“Because the Fourth Amendment 
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort 
of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more 
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing 
these claims.”); Massaro, supra note 22, at 1115 (“The Court has since cited only 
judicial authority concerns of vagueness, open-ended provisions, and the 
absence of meaningful judicial standards in explaining Graham.”). 
 33. The Graham doctrine has been criticized on various grounds. See, e.g., 
Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed Bodily 
Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 51–56) 
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Graham doctrine does not foreclose the possibility that a wrong 
could implicate multiple constitutional claims.34 Moreover, 
nothing about the Graham doctrine suggests that courts should 
interpret an unenumerated, substantive due process right—like 
the right to privacy—as preempting either a textually grounded 
constitutional claim35 or another unenumerated right.36 
III. Undue Burden Preemption 
Before the Supreme Court established a new standard for 
evaluating abortion restrictions in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, such restrictions were 
analyzed under strict scrutiny, pursuant to the framework set out 
in Roe v. Wade.37 Casey changed the Roe framework in several 
                                                                                                     
[hereinafter Borgmann, The Constitutionality] (arguing that the Graham 
doctrine wrongly assumes that the Fourth Amendment offers doctrinally clearer 
guideposts than substantive due process in the context of state-imposed bodily 
intrusions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority Over the Body”: The Decencies of Civilized 
Conduct, The Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
423, 436–37 (2007) (criticizing the Graham doctrine’s “confining [of] rights to 
bodily integrity” to the Fourth Amendment as “somewhat mysterious and 
largely ineffective”); Massaro, supra note 22, at 1115–16 (arguing that the 
Graham doctrine, as broadly interpreted, amounts to an inadvisable adoption of 
Hugo Black’s rejected “jot-for-jot” interpretation of the Due Process Clause). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 
49 (1993). 
 35. Cf. Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1535 n.8 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that, although under Graham and Albright the Fourth Amendment displaces 
substantive due process claims concerning whether police acted with probable 
cause, it does not displace separate claims brought under “the equally explicit 
constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment and Equal Protection 
Clause”), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 
905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001).  
 36. See, Massaro, supra note 22, at 1087 (“[The] trumping move [of the 
Graham doctrine] displaces only one general provision: substantive due 
process.”) 
 37. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973) (providing that a state 
must have a compelling interest in regulating abortion prior to the first 
trimester, and that it may reasonably regulate abortion procedure after the first 
trimester); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
61 (1976) (applying Roe’s strict scrutiny framework); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986) (same), overruled by 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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significant ways, which some lower courts have interpreted as 
impelling the concept of undue burden preemption. First, the 
Court recognized the state’s interest in the embryo or fetus as a 
valid basis for abortion regulation throughout pregnancy,38 not 
just after viability as Roe had held.39 Second, the Court lowered 
the standard from strict scrutiny to the more nebulous undue 
burden standard, which asks whether a law has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion.40 
Since Casey, some lower courts seem to view the undue 
burden standard as preempting nearly all other substantive 
claims that might otherwise be brought against an abortion 
restriction.41 The Fifth Circuit suggests that this is because Casey 
struck a delicate balance between the woman’s rights and the 
interest of the state in the embryo or fetus in the pre-viability 
period of pregnancy, and it regards other substantive claims 
attacking abortion restrictions as disturbing this equilibrium.42 
The Fifth Circuit adheres to this view even when the separate 
claims are asserting the rights of entirely different parties 
(doctors, rather than patients, for example).43 Three particular 
doctrines that different courts have found to be preempted by the 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) 
(“[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in 
protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child.”); see also Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and 
Carhart, 31 FORD. URB. L.J. 675, 678–701 (2004) (discussing Casey’s changes to 
the Roe framework). 
 39. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 463 (“With respect to the State’s important and 
legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.”). 
 40. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is 
the appropriate means of reconciling the state’s interest with the woman’s 
constitutionally protected liberty.”). 
 41. One exception to this is vagueness, which even courts that apply undue 
burden preemption seem to agree is a doctrinally independent claim. See, e.g., 
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580–84 
(5th Cir. 2013) (applying the void for vagueness doctrine as a standalone 
inquiry); Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 503–06 
(6th Cir. 2012) (same). 
 42. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing Tex. Med. 
Providers Performing Abortion Servs.,667 F.3d at 576–77).  
 43. See infra notes 178–93 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth 
Circuit’s application of the undue burden analysis in Lakey as occupying the 
field of constitutional claims). 
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undue burden standard are bodily integrity,44 equal protection,45 
and compelled speech.46 Because the Casey joint opinion did not 
analyze the abortion restrictions at issue there under bodily 
integrity or the equal protection doctrine,47 it is difficult to argue 
that undue burden preemption in these contexts is compelled by 
Casey. Nevertheless some lower courts have, sua sponte, 
concluded that the undue burden standard displaces or limits 
these claims.48 Compelled speech, on the other hand, was 
addressed in Casey, albeit briefly.49 Analyzing undue burden 
preemption in the compelled speech context requires examining 
Casey’s own confusing treatment of the compelled speech claim 
there, as well as lower courts’ interpretations of Casey as 
supporting undue burden preemption of compelled speech claims. 
A. Bodily Integrity 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ treatment of a bodily 
integrity claim against an abortion restriction offers perhaps the 
most straightforward example of undue burden preemption. In 
Planned Parenthood Southwestern Ohio Region v. DeWine,50 the 
Sixth Circuit in effect applied undue burden preemption when it 
upheld a state restriction on medication abortion.51 The Sixth 
Circuit reasoned, in part, that bodily integrity claims, which 
                                                                                                     
 44. Infra Part III.A. 
 45. Infra Part III.B. 
 46. Infra Part III.C. 
 47. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844–47 
(1992) (discussing the statutory provisions at issue and finding that the abortion 
right is constitutionally protected under the framework of substantive due 
process); cf. id. at 896 (noting that effect of Pennsylvania’s husband notification 
provision “on a woman’s protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such 
a case, as the State has touched not only upon the private sphere of the family 
but upon the very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman”). 
 48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 
490, 506 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying the undue burden standard to a bodily 
integrity claim). 
 49. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 50. 696 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 51. See id. at 514, 518 (concluding that a statutory restriction on 
medication abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an 
undue burden on the ability to get an abortion). 
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would normally be subject to strict scrutiny, should be analyzed 
under Casey’s undue burden standard when asserted against 
abortion requirements.52 
In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had 
approved the drug mifepristone—also known as RU-486 or the 
early abortion pill—for use in the United States.53 The FDA 
approved a specific regimen for administering mifepristone, but 
soon thereafter abortion providers began to change the protocol.54 
These adaptations were based on evidence from clinical trials 
that suggested, among other things, that lower dosages of the 
drug were equally effective and that the drug could safely and 
effectively be administered later in pregnancy.55 This type of “off-
label” use of a drug is routine and completely legal.56 
In 2004, however, Ohio enacted a law requiring abortion 
providers to adhere to the original FDA-approved protocol.57 
Planned Parenthood58 argued that this law unnecessarily 
required higher dosages of medication with no medical 
justification, and that the protocol increased the costs of 
abortion.59 The plaintiffs challenged the requirement as 
unconstitutionally vague, a violation of women’s bodily integrity, 
and an undue burden.60 
Addressing the bodily intrusion claim, the Sixth Circuit 
recognized that “individuals possess a constitutional right to be 
free from forcible physical intrusions of their bodies against their 
will, absent a compelling state interest.”61 However, the court 
found that the strict scrutiny that courts normally apply to 
violations of bodily integrity does not apply to a bodily intrusion 
                                                                                                     
 52. Id. at 506. 
 53. Id. at 494. 
 54. Id. at 495. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 495–96. 
 57. See id. at 496 (describing Ohio House Bill 126, codified at OHIO REV. 
CODE § 2919.123 (2006)). 
58. Id. at 493–94.  The plaintiffs included two Ohio Planned Parenthood 
regional clinics and two Planned Parenthood directors.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 496–97. 
 60. Id. at 498. 
 61. Id. at 506. 
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that occurs in the context of abortion.62 The Sixth Circuit seemed 
to view the plaintiffs as attempting to cheat by invoking a claim 
that would merit higher scrutiny than the undue burden 
standard: 
Although we understand why Planned Parenthood took this 
approach—requiring the government to show a compelling 
state interest for the Act would relieve Planned Parenthood of 
its obligation to show an undue burden on the right to choose 
an abortion—this argument is unconvincing. “Strict scrutiny, 
of course, no longer applies to abortion legislation.”63 
The Sixth Circuit in DeWine regarded “[g]overnment 
restrictions on abortions [as] a form of interference with the right 
to bodily integrity and control over an individual’s person,”64 but 
it interpreted the undue burden standard as swallowing the 
bodily integrity analysis.65 Thus, the court said, the plaintiffs 
retained a viable right to bodily integrity claim, but “the analysis 
will map the undue-burden framework.”66  
By lumping together all “restrictions on abortion” as 
triggering (only) the undue burden standard, the Sixth Circuit 
failed to recognize that the bodily integrity claim alleged in 
DeWine was of a different quality than one focused on whether a 
restriction places a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion, as the undue burden inquiry examines.67 
The right to bodily integrity is a broad umbrella that 
encompasses the right to affirmative decision-making about one’s 
body as well as the right to repel unwanted bodily intrusions.68 
Abortion restrictions may encompass the former if they 
excessively burden a woman’s ability to choose abortion.69 In 
                                                                                                     
 62. See id.  
 63. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 
F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 64. Id. at 507. 
 65. See id. at 506–07. 
 66. Id. at 507. 
 67. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  
 68. Borgmann, The Constitutionality, supra note 33, at 5. 
 69. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 896 (“The effect of state regulation on a woman’s 
protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such a case, as the State has 
touched not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon the very bodily 
integrity of the pregnant woman.”). 
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DeWine, the specific bodily intrusion claim made about 
medication abortion was of the latter category; the plaintiffs 
argued that the restriction unnecessarily forced certain women, 
who would otherwise be eligible for medication abortions under 
the new protocol, to undergo surgery as the only means to 
obtaining an abortion.70 As the court recognized, “forcible physical 
intrusions of the body by their government” are normally subject 
to strict scrutiny.71 These claims are not the same as a claim of 
denied or burdened access to abortion.  
The difference between the two claims should be clear from 
the court’s separate discussion of the plaintiffs’ undue burden 
claim. Both the majority and the dissenting judge discussed the 
undue burden claim in terms of how the law burdened a woman’s 
access to abortion, asking such questions as whether otherwise-
eligible women who could not obtain a medication abortion 
because of the law would forgo abortion altogether, and how 
much the FDA protocol increased abortion costs as compared 
with the new protocols.72 Nevertheless, the court viewed this very 
distinct type of claim as preempting the claim that the state 
should not be allowed to effectively force a woman to undergo 
surgery, when another safe medical option is available, absent a 
compelling reason.73 
B. Equal Protection 
There are a number of different types of equal protection 
claims that might be brought against abortion restrictions. First, 
claims may be divided based on whose rights are being asserted: 
abortion providers or women seeking abortions.74 Next, equal 
                                                                                                     
 70. DeWine, 696 F.3d at 506 
 71. Id.  
 72. See id. at 514–18 (“[O]ur case law indicates a statute that ‘restrict[s] 
the most commonly used procedure’ is likely to be problematic.” (quoting 
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 2003))); id. at 
507–13 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“[A]t the least, statutes banning the most 
common method of an abortion impose an unconstitutional burden on a woman’s 
rights.”). 
 73. See id. at 507. 
 74. See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 162 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Greenville Women’s Clinic, the Charleston Women’s Medical 
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protection claims asserting women’s rights can be of two 
varieties: equal protection claims premised on abortion as a 
fundamental right (“fundamental rights equal protection 
claims”), and equal protection claims based on sex discrimination 
(sex discrimination claims). Both of the latter types of equal 
protection claims have fallen prey to undue burden preemption. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted fundamental 
rights equal protection claims in the abortion context as being 
subsumed within the undue burden standard. In Planned 
Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. 
Dempsey,75 the plaintiff challenged on equal protection grounds, 
among others, a Missouri law preventing abortion providers from 
receiving state family planning funds.76 The court disagreed that 
the law should be subject to strict scrutiny, noting that “[a]ny 
constitutional right of clinics to provide abortion services . . . is 
derived directly from women’s constitutional right to choose 
abortion.”77 It noted that Casey established a new standard of 
review for abortion regulations.78 The court then shifted to an 
analysis indistinguishable from the undue burden standard, 
including an assessment of whether the law would “have the 
effect of placing an undue burden on women seeking abortion 
services” and concluding that it would not.79  
Similarly, in addressing targeted regulations of abortion 
providers (TRAP laws), both the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts 
of Appeals have held that equal protection claims premised on 
abortion as a constitutionally protected right “collapse[] with the 
undue burden claim.”80 This, the courts maintain, is because 
                                                                                                     
Clinic, Inc., and Dr. William Lynn . . . brought this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that Regulation 61-12 is unconstitutional on its face because, among 
other things, it would violate their . . . equal protection rights, as well as those of 
their patients.”). 
 75. 167 F.3d 458 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 76. Id. at 460–61. 
 77. Id. at 464. 
 78. See id. at 464 (“Since Casey, we have applied the undue burden test in 
cases involving legislation that affects the right to abortion.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 544–45 (9th Cir. 2004); 
see also Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 173 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(“[B]ecause we have concluded . . . that South Carolina’s Regulation . . . does not 
place an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make an abortion decision, there 
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“Casey defined a new standard of judicial review for determining 
when courts can recognize burdens on [the abortion] right as 
unconstitutional, . . . replacing the traditional scrutiny analysis 
with the undue burden test.”81  
It is true that equal protection claims that challenge 
classifications implicating the exercise of a constitutional right 
often receive the same level of scrutiny traditionally applied to a 
direct violation of that right.82 But this does not mean that courts 
evaluating such equal protection claims should simply act as 
though the claimant has alleged a violation of the substantive 
right. An equal protection claim makes a distinct assertion, 
namely that the differential treatment of the plaintiff is 
unconstitutional.83 The level of protection afforded to the 
underlying right helps to determine the level of scrutiny the court 
should apply in determining whether the plaintiff is correct,84 but 
it is not always appropriate to apply precisely the same test to a 
claim of equal protection as would be applied to a claim directly 
attacking a violation of the underlying right. This is particularly 
so where the test applicable to the underlying substantive right is 
one that focuses specifically on the extent of interference with the 
                                                                                                     
is no need to resolve whether it remains a fundamental right for an equal 
protection analysis and thus requires application of the strict-scrutiny 
standard.” (citation omitted)). 
 81. Tucson Women’s Clinic, 378 F.3d at 544; see also Greenville Women’s 
Clinic, 222 F.3d at 172–73 (“The Casey decision does not . . . apply the 
traditional strict-scrutiny standard which protects fundamental rights. Rather, 
the Court adopted an ‘undue burden’ standard.” (citation omitted)). 
 82. See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282–83 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(analyzing an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim 
by reference to the standard applicable to the free exercise claim). 
 83. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (indicating that 
the Fourteenth Amendment is meant in part to ensure that “equal protection 
and security should be given to all under like circumstances” and that “[c]lass 
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited” 
(citations and quotations omitted)). 
 84. See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating 
Women’s Sexualtiy, 56 EMORY L.J. 1236, 1293 n.416 (2007) (noting that 
“[c]lassifications made in legislation that burdens a fundamental right are 
subject to strict scrutiny” (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–23 
(2004))); Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 282–83 (“Because we held, above, that the 
Religious Exclusion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, we apply rational 
basis scrutiny to the fundamental rights based claim that this exclusion violates 
equal protection.”). 
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plaintiff’s exercise of that right. The undue burden standard, as 
discussed above, is premised on access to abortion; it is ill-suited 
to assessing claims that center instead on the unjustified 
dissimilarity of the law’s treatment of the plaintiffs.85 
Thus, for example, a law that deliberately singles out certain 
religious adherents for differential treatment may be 
unconstitutional even if the restriction only negligibly or 
indirectly affects their ability to exercise their religion freely. In 
Niemotko v. State of Maryland86 and Fowler v. Rhode Island,87 
the Supreme Court held that policies were unconstitutionally 
discriminatory where they denied Jehovah’s Witnesses, but not 
other religious groups, the right to use public parks for religious 
gatherings.88 In each case, the Court’s focus was on the disparate 
treatment accorded the Witnesses. The Court did not appear 
interested in the extent to which this burden impeded the 
Witnesses’ ability to practice their religion freely. Rather, the 
Court found objectionable the differential treatment of Witnesses 
as compared with other religious groups. In Niemotko, for 
example, the Court suggested that the Witnesses were being 
discriminated against because of the particular religious views 
and practices to which they adhered: 
The conclusion is inescapable that the use of the park was 
denied because of the City Council’s dislike for or 
disagreement with the Witnesses or their views. The right to 
equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms 
of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth 
                                                                                                     
 85. Strict scrutiny, in contrast, is equally well adapted to assessing claims 
of discrimination as it is to assessing substantive rights violations, and indeed it 
has historically been used to assess both kinds of claims. See, e.g., Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification 
that burdened a certain class of individuals’ exercise of the fundamental right to 
procreation).  
 86. 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
 87. 345 U.S. 67 (1953). 
 88. See Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272–73 (concluding that the government’s 
“completely arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to grant permits” for use of 
parks to Jehovah’s Witnesses, but not to other religious groups, was a denial of 
equal protection); Fowler, 345 U.S. at 67–69 (finding that the government’s 
refusal to allow the services of Jehovah’s Witnesses, yet not other religious 
groups, violated the First Amendment); id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(concurring in the opinion of the Court but clarifying that the Equal Protection 
Clause, not the First Amendment, is the relevant constitutional provision). 
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Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims or 
personal opinions of a local governing body.89 
The availability of equal protection as a claim distinct from 
undue burden is particularly important for laws—like TRAP 
laws—that do not purport to promote any interest in the embryo 
or fetus: 
The deferential Casey standard [was] developed to balance 
women’s liberty and privacy against the state interest in 
protecting fetal life—an interest that [is] not related to the 
licensing and facility requirements imposed on abortion clinics 
by [TRAP] laws. By using the deferential Casey standard to 
replace the strict or heightened scrutiny that the women’s 
equal protection claims would normally warrant, these courts 
effectively took the view that the equality rights of pregnant 
women are attenuated when their unequal treatment relates 
to abortion.90 
Abortion restrictions that purport to promote women’s safety 
are more likely to be pretextual than measures that openly aim to 
discourage abortion or to promote the state’s interest in 
embryonic or fetal life. TRAP laws that profess to make abortion 
safer are in fact an increasingly potent part of the arsenal anti-
abortion-rights activists are employing in their fight to make 
abortion illegal.91 Even where such laws do not succeed in 
shutting down all clinics, they aim to make abortion disfavored in 
the law, thereby “chang[ing] hearts and minds” on the issue and 
ultimately, activists hope, paving the way for a complete ban.92  
                                                                                                     
 89. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272; see also Fowler, 345 U.S. at 69 (emphasizing 
as “fatal to [the State’s] case” that “a religious service of Jehovah’s Witnesses is 
treated differently than a religious service of other sects,” which “amounts to the 
state preferring some religious groups over this one”). 
 90. Buchanan, supra note 84, at 1293. 
 91. Caitlin E. Borgmann, In Abortion Litigation, It’s the Facts That Matter, 
127 HARV. L. REV. F. 149, 151 (2014) [hereinafter Borgmann, In Abortion 
Litigation] (observing that, after signing a law that requires “abortion providers 
[to] secure admitting privileges at nearby hospitals” the Mississippi governor 
stated, “This is a historic day to begin the process of ending abortion in 
Mississippi” (quotations omitted)). 
 92. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of 
Truth for the Anti-Abortion Rights Movement, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 
246–47 (2013) (describing the “incrementalist” strategy and citing anti-abortion 
strategy memos); Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: 
Using Sex Equality Arguments to Demand Examination of State Interest in 
Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 377, 389–91 (2011) (same). 
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It should not matter whether these laws immediately achieve 
their long-term goal of blocking abortion access. The fact that 
they uniquely burden abortion without proper justification should 
make the laws invalid.93 A recent Seventh Circuit decision 
upholding a preliminary injunction of Wisconsin’s admitting 
privileges law acknowledged the distinct lens that an equal 
protection inquiry brings to cases of this kind, noting: “An issue of 
equal protection of the laws is lurking in this case. For the state 
seems indifferent to complications from non-hospital procedures 
other than surgical abortion (especially other gynecological 
procedures, even when they are more likely to produce 
complications).”94 
Because abortion remains a fundamental right after Casey,95 
courts should apply strict scrutiny to fundamental rights equal 
protection claims brought against abortion restrictions.96 In 
Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant,97 the court wrongly assumed 
the abortion right’s fundamental status was in doubt after 
Casey.98 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Tucson Women’s 
                                                                                                     
 93. If courts were not so single-mindedly focused on the effects part of the 
undue burden test and instead took the “purpose prong” more seriously as an 
independent basis on which to invalidate an abortion law, the same conclusion 
could be reached under the undue burden standard. See Borgmann, In Abortion 
Litigation, supra note 91, at 149–50 (distinguishing between the purpose and 
effects prongs of the undue burden test and noting that “it is possible to smoke 
out illegitimate purposes indirectly”); see also id. at 150 (“Factually unsupported 
laws that infringe constitutionally protected rights should not be allowed to 
stand. Such a shortcoming infects an entire law and warrants its wholesale 
invalidation.”). 
 94. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-2726, 2013 WL 
6698596, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 2013). 
 95. Infra note 100. 
 96. See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 172–74 
(4th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs argued—albeit unsuccessfully—that South Carolina 
clinic regulation must be analyzed under strict scrutiny because it treated 
abortion differently from comparable medical procedures and implicated the 
right to abortion); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (observing 
that “classifications affecting fundamental rights . . . are given the most 
exacting scrutiny” (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 
(1966))); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 54 
(1983) (noting that “strict scrutiny [is] applied when government action 
impinges upon a fundamental right”). 
 97. 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 98. Id. at 172 (“In Roe, the abortion-decision right was found to be 
fundamental. But following Casey, that conclusion may be in doubt.” (citations 
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Clinic v. Eden,99 this conclusion is contradicted by Casey itself.100 
Yet, despite recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit, like the Fourth 
Circuit, applied undue burden preemption rather than evaluating 
the equal protection claim independently under strict scrutiny. 
At the very least, given that abortion is not only a 
fundamental but a controversial right, courts refusing to apply 
strict scrutiny to such claims should apply “second-order rational 
basis review” to fundamental rights equal protection claims in 
order to ensure that laws are not enacted out of animus to 
abortion providers.101 Had the Eighth Circuit in Dempsey applied 
this review, for example, it would have inquired into whether the 
state’s discrimination against abortion providers in the 
distribution of state family planning funds reflected such 
animus.102  
We need not speculate as to the outcome the Eighth Circuit 
would have reached to see that a traditional equal protection 
analysis is a very different one from the undue burden standard 
the court applied. The relevant questions should not be whether 
the law was intended to or in fact prevented or unduly burdened 
women’s access to abortion, but rather whether the state’s 
asserted interest in preserving embryonic and fetal life was 
sufficient to justify the disparate treatment of abortion providers, 
and—if so—how the denial of family planning funds related to 
                                                                                                     
omitted)). 
 99. 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 100. See id. at 539 (“Women have a fundamental liberty interest, protected 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in obtaining an 
abortion. . . . In Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this central holding of Roe 
v. Wade.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 544 (“The right to abortion is a 
fundamental constitutional right. Casey explicitly reaffirmed Roe’s holding in 
this regard . . . .”). 
 101. Cf. id. at 545–46 (recognizing “that abortion providers can be a 
politically unpopular group” but finding that “no evidence has been presented 
that is sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to whether there is a 
stigmatizing or animus based purpose to the law”). 
 102. Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv. Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (referring to majority opinion’s 
apparent but unacknowledged application of heightened scrutiny under guise of 
rational basis review as “‘second order’ rational-basis review”); see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike 
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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that goal.103 In fact, if the court was correct that the funding ban 
had a negligible impact on the availability of abortion because 
those abortions were paid for with private funds anyway,104 this 
would seemingly undermine the state’s justification for denying 
such funds. That denial would not save a single fetus, according 
to the court,105 nor could the state plausibly claim that family 
planning funds were contributing to the destruction of fetuses.106 
Even if the court were to conclude that the law did not violate 
equal protection, it should have done so by focusing on the state’s 
differential treatment of abortion and abortion providers, not on 
whether the restriction imposed an “undue burden” on women’s 
access to abortion. 
In addition to fundamental rights equal protection, sex 
discrimination provides another ground for challenging some 
abortion restrictions. Yet, here too, undue burden preemption has 
reared its head. In Tucson, plaintiffs separately claimed that the 
Arizona TRAP law constituted sex discrimination because it 
targeted for special burdens medical procedures sought only by 
women.107 Although the Ninth Circuit did not rule out the 
possibility that the law discriminated based on sex, it invoked 
undue burden preemption, rendering plaintiff’s claim 
irrelevant.108 
                                                                                                     
 103. Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 F.3d 
458, 460–61 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to 
Tier I of § 10.715 of the Missouri code, which “prohibits family-planning funds 
from being used to perform, assist, encourage, or make direct referrals for 
abortions” and “provides that organizations or affiliates of organizations that 
‘provide or promote abortions’ are not eligible for family-planning funds”). 
 104. See id. at 465 (noting that Planned Parenthood’s abortion services were 
“funded through independent private sources”). 
 105. See id at 464–65 (noting that, contrary to the district court’s findings, 
“the record suggests that the legislature was aware that denying Planned 
Parenthood’s family-planning funds would not affect Planned Parenthood’s 
ability to provide abortion services”). 
 106. See id at 465 (noting that “Planned Parenthood has consistently 
maintained that State family-planning funds do not subsidize abortion services 
in any way” and “abortion services are funded through independent private 
sources”). 
 107. Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 547 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 108. Infra text accompanying note 114. 
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Geduldig v. Aiello109 in 
1974, it was generally believed that sex discrimination claims 
challenging classifications based on pregnancy (including laws 
targeting abortion) were no longer tenable.110 In Geduldig, the 
Court appeared to shut the door on such claims when it found 
that discrimination based on pregnancy was not (necessarily) sex 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.111 In 2003, 
however, in Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs,112 the 
Supreme Court “implied that laws which facially discriminate on 
the basis of pregnancy, even those that facially appear to benefit 
pregnant persons, can still be unconstitutional if the medical or 
biological facts that distinguish pregnancy do not reasonably 
explain the discrimination at hand.”113 The Ninth Circuit, 
seemingly breathing new life into sex discrimination claims in the 
abortion context, agreed that “Hibbs strongly supports plaintiffs’ 
argument that singling out abortion in ways unrelated to the 
facts distinguishing abortion from other medical procedures is an 
unconstitutional form of discrimination on the basis of gender.”114 
But then, with the next breath, the court snuffed the flame. 
It concluded that, “even if laws singling out abortion can be 
judicially recognized as not gender neutral, where such laws 
facially promote maternal health or fetal life, Casey replaces the 
intermediate scrutiny such a law would normally receive under 
the equal protection clause with the undue burden standard”115 
Inexplicably, the court suggested that Casey had specifically 
supplanted equal protection claims with the undue burden 
                                                                                                     
 109. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 110. See Smith, supra note 92, at 383 (noting that the Geduldig case “was 
read as a broad rejection of the claim that pregnancy discrimination is sex 
discrimination”). 
 111. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (“While it is true that only women 
can become pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification 
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.”). But see Smith, supra note 
92, at 386 (noting that “Geduldig left open the possibility that some pregnancy 
classifications would constitute sex discrimination”). 
 112. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 113. Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 733 n.6). 
 114. Id. at 548. 
 115. Id. at 549. 
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standard,116 although the joint opinion in Casey did not analyze 
the challenged provisions under Equal Protection Clause at all.117 
If the Ninth Circuit had applied intermediate scrutiny to the sex 
discrimination equal protection claim at issue in Tucson, it would 
have asked whether the Arizona TRAP law was supported by an 
“exceedingly persuasive” justification, and whether the 
“‘discriminatory means employed’ [were] ‘substantially related to 
the achievement of important governmental objectives.’”118 Again, 
this analysis is a very different one from the undue burden 
standard that the court applied. The relevant questions should be 
not whether the law was intended to or in fact prevented or 
unduly burdened women’s access to abortion, but rather whether 
the state could justify the differential treatment of abortion 
providers by showing that the TRAP law was closely related to its 
stated goal of protecting women’s health. In addressing these 
questions, the burden of justification would have been on the 
State, not the plaintiffs.119 Instead, the Ninth Circuit’s flawed 
analysis rendered wholly superfluous the plaintiffs’ distinct claim 
premised on sex discrimination.120 
C. Compelled Speech 
Compelled speech is the one claim besides the plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process claim that the Court specifically 
                                                                                                     
 116. See id. at 539 (“[A] plurality of the Court abandoned both traditional 
equal protection scrutiny analysis and the accompanying trimester framework of 
Roe . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 117. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 
(1992) (explaining that the right to abortion is protected under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 884–85 (briefly analyzing 
“informed consent” provision under First Amendment). 
 118. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996). 
 119. See id. (noting that “[t]he burden of justification [of gender 
classifications] is demanding and it rests entirely on the State”).  
 120. Cf. Smith, supra note 92, (explaining how “analyzing abortion 
restrictions using a sex equality analysis” can create a more multi-dimensional 
understanding of how abortion restrictions violate women’s rights); Reva B. 
Siegel, Abortion As a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in 
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST HISTORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF 
MOTHERHOOD 43, 67–68 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) 
(same). 
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addressed in Casey.121 Casey by no means compels or even 
justifies undue burden preemption of free speech claims in the 
abortion context. But the joint opinion is sufficiently confusing in 
its treatment of physicians’ First Amendment claims to have 
sowed confusion among lower courts as to whether or how the 
undue burden standard and compelled speech doctrine intersect. 
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 
held that compelled speech claims against pre-abortion 
ultrasound requirements and other mandated pre-abortion 
disclosures are essentially coextensive with undue burden claims 
against these laws.122 As with bodily integrity and equal 
protection claims, this results in a weakening of First 
Amendment compelled speech claims when they are raised in the 
context of abortion.  
Generally, the Supreme Court closely reviews laws that 
target speech for regulation based on agreement or disagreement 
with the speaker’s viewpoint.123 The Court has explained:  
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored 
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or 
views expressed are content based. . . . By contrast, laws that 
confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference 
to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content 
neutral.124 
When laws discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, the Supreme 
Court generally applies “the most exacting scrutiny.”125 This 
rigorous scrutiny applies equally to laws that limit speech and 
                                                                                                     
 121. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (addressing claim by petitioners of “an 
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about 
the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State” 
(citation omitted)). 
 122. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]nformed consent laws that do not impose an undue 
burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they require 
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures. . . . [S]uch laws are . . . 
reasonable regulation[s] of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of 
compelling ‘ideological’ speech . . . .”). 
 123. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) 
(“Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that 
suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of 
its content.”). 
 124. Id. at 643. 
 125. Id. at 642. 
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those that “compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing 
a particular message.”126  
The Supreme Court has recently held that any “content-
based” or “speaker-based” restriction on speech warrants 
heightened scrutiny.127 Thus, even in the context of commercial 
speech, which has traditionally received less constitutional 
protection,128 the Court has skeptically viewed restrictions it sees 
as discriminating based on the content of the speech or identity of 
the speaker.129 Following these precedents, in R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. FDA,130 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit applied heightened scrutiny to strike down 
an FDA rule requiring new textual warnings and graphic images 
on cigarette packaging.131 The court found that the warnings 
“represent[ed] an ongoing effort to discourage consumers from 
buying the [tobacco] Companies’ products, rather than . . . a 
measure designed to combat specific deceptive claims.”132 
The Supreme Court’s precedents calling for stringent review 
of content-based speech restrictions have been applied to 
invalidate state interference with doctor–patient 
communications. For example, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a 
federal governmental policy that threatened to punish physicians 
for discussing with their patients the medical use of marijuana.133 
                                                                                                     
 126. Id. (citations omitted); see also Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 
WL 186310, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (stating, in the context of a challenge 
to pre-abortion ultrasound mandate, that content-based, government-compelled 
speech is generally subject to strict scrutiny). 
 127. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664–65 (2011) 
(applying heightened scrutiny in the context of commercial speech). 
 128. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (noting 
that the Court has “afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, 
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment 
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the 
realm of noncommercial expression”). 
 129. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664–65 (finding that the law at issue “is 
designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on protected expression” 
and rejecting the State’s argument “that heightened judicial scrutiny is 
unwarranted because its law is mere commercial regulation”). 
 130. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 131. The court applied intermediate rather than strict scrutiny because the 
case involved “compelled commercial speech.” Id. at 1217–18. 
 132. Id. at 1216. 
 133. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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The court found that the law was content based, and therefore 
subject to heightened scrutiny, because it “condemn[ed] 
expression of a particular viewpoint, i.e., that medical marijuana 
would likely help a specific patient.”134 Similarly, a federal 
district court recently enjoined a Florida law that forbade doctors 
to discuss gun ownership safety with their patients as part of the 
practice of preventive medicine.135 Florida asserted that the law 
was intended to “prevent . . . harassment and discrimination by 
health care providers against patients based on their ownership 
of firearms.”136 The court described the statute as “impos[ing] 
content-based restrictions on [physicians’] speech.”137 The court 
found that “[t]he State, through this law, inserts itself in the 
doctor–patient relationship, prohibiting and burdening speech 
necessary to the proper practice of preventive medicine.”138 
Casey did not appear to apply heightened scrutiny to the 
“informed consent” provision at issue there, even though some of 
the required information clearly conveyed the state’s ideological 
opposition to abortion.139 The statute in Casey “require[d] that, at 
least [twenty-four] hours before performing an abortion, a 
physician inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the 
health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and ‘the probable 
gestational age of the unborn child.’”140 It also required that “[t]he 
physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of 
the availability of printed materials published by the State 
describing the fetus and providing information about medical 
assistance for childbirth, . . . child support from the father, and a 
list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as 
alternatives to abortion.”141 To the extent that some of the 
                                                                                                     
 134. Id. at 637; see also id. at 639 (stating that “the government’s policy 
must have the requisite ‘narrow specificity’” (citing Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement 
of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). 
 135. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255–56, 1270 (S.D. 
Fla. 2013). 
 136. Id. at 1256. 
 137. Id. at 1261. 
 138. Id. at 1266. 
 139. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
 140. Id. at 881. 
 141. Id. 
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information was clearly viewpoint-based,142 Casey’s failure to 
clearly apply heightened scrutiny seems inconsistent with 
existing case law.143 
States have wide latitude to regulate the medical profession 
in the interests of ensuring the public’s safety.144 This interest 
has prompted nearly every state to compel medical practitioners 
to convey information deemed necessary for a patient’s informed 
consent.145 The general purpose of informed consent laws is to 
                                                                                                     
 142. Telling women about the nature of the procedure and the risks of 
abortion and childbirth is the kind of information that is typically conveyed in 
normal informed consent dialogues. Infra note 146. But information that 
conveys what the embryo or fetus looks like, or that makes the alternative of 
childbirth seem more attractive or financially tenable, has nothing to do with 
the medical aspects of the woman’s decision and is only provided because the 
state prefers that women choose childbirth. See id. at 935–36 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The requirements . . . that the 
woman be advised that medical assistance benefits may be available, and that 
the father is responsible for financial assistance in the support of the child 
similarly are poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion 
decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Pennsylvania does not require 
that women seeking prenatal care be told of the options of abortion or adoption.  
But see Texas Med. Providers v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, 
at *5 (W.D. Texas Feb. 6, 2012) (describing the plaintiffs’ compelled speech 
claims in Casey as bordering on frivolous, unlike the First Amendment issue 
before the court). 
 143. Although the Supreme Court had not earlier evaluated similar 
“informed consent” laws under free speech doctrine, it did recognize that 
mandating specific information that is not normally part of medical informed 
consent was an impermissible attempt by the state to convey its viewpoint 
through the doctor. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747, 760–64 (1986) (invalidating disclosure requirements similar to 
those in Casey and describing them as “nothing less than an outright attempt to 
wedge the State’s message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the 
informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician”), overruled by 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833. But see City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 n.37 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (noting in 
dicta that mandating “the availability of information on birth control and 
adoption . . . and the availability of assistance during pregnancy and after 
childbirth” if accurate, “certainly is not objectionable”). 
 144. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. 
of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply strict 
scrutiny where state psychologist licensing scheme “was not adopted because of 
any disagreement with psychoanalytical theories”). 
 145. See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed 
Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 
430 (2006) (noting that forty-eight states have adopted either a physician-based 
or patient-based standard for informed consent). 
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inform, not to persuade or to convey a particular moral point of 
view.146 “Informed consent” requirements like those validated in 
Casey, however, perform a very different function. Abortion 
disclosure laws have nothing to do with the practice of medicine 
or with ensuring patients’ safety147 and everything to do with 
conveying the state’s disapproval of abortion.148 For this reason, 
one would expect that they would be treated as other viewpoint 
discriminatory laws and subjected to at least heightened, if not 
strict, scrutiny.149 Casey, however, did not clearly subject the 
disclosure mandate there to strict or heightened scrutiny. Casey’s 
treatment of the disclosure mandate is confusing and in part 
seemingly conflates due process analysis with First Amendment 
analysis. This has led some lower courts to conclude that First 
Amendment claims raised against abortion restrictions receive 
less protection. 
In addressing the mandated disclosure law at issue in Casey, 
the Supreme Court first determined whether the requirement 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s 
Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 816 (1996) (pointing 
out that “the moral appropriateness of a particular medical procedure is 
normally assumed to be outside the proper range of physician disclosures”). 
 147. This differentiates them, for example, from laws prohibiting the 
practice of sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE), as the latter are intended 
to protect patients from harm. See, e.g., King v. Christie, Civ. Action No. 13-
5038, 2013 WL 5970343, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2013) (“[D]octor-patient 
communications about medical treatment receive substantial First 
Amendment protection, but the government has more leeway to regulate the 
conduct necessary to administering treatment itself.” (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 
728 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013))); Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-
KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *24 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (“[T]he 
plaintiffs’ protected fundamental right is a patient’s decision whether to seek 
treatment or not; but a patient’s ‘selection of a particular treatment, or at least a 
medication, is within the area of governmental interest in protecting health.’”), 
aff’d, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 148. See Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 179–80 (2013) (“Most of the states that have enacted pre-
abortion disclosure laws have designed the disclosures to discourage abortion 
and/or promote fetal life.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Federation of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 
781, 798–801 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny to a state’s content-based law 
compelling certain speech); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (concluding that the state may not “prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion”). 
1074 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047 (2014) 
violated the undue burden standard.150 The Court’s 
admonishment that any mandated information be “truthful and 
not misleading”151 seemed to refer to normal medical informed 
consent requirements,152 which mandate the provision of factual 
information to allow a patient autonomy in making her own 
decision about her care.153 But the joint opinion also emphasized 
the state’s prerogative to express its moral opposition to abortion 
and even to attempt to convince women not to choose abortion: 
the opinion stated, “Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the 
State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage [a 
woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments 
of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing 
the pregnancy to full term.”154 The Court thus concluded that 
“informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that 
all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made 
irrelevant.”155 
The Court next, very briefly, addressed whether the 
mandated disclosure violated physicians’ First Amendment right 
not to speak.156 The Court implicitly acknowledged that the First 
Amendment ordinarily protects against government-compelled 
speech, citing Wooley v. Maynard,157 which held that New 
Hampshire could not constitutionally require citizens to display 
                                                                                                     
 150. Infra notes 172–202 and accompanying text. 
 151. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
 152. See id. at 882–84 (comparing information disclosure for abortion with 
other procedures, observing that “a requirement that a doctor give a 
woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for 
constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give 
certain specific information about any medical procedure”). 
 153. See id. at 881 (“Our prior decisions establish that as with any medical 
procedure, the State may require a woman to give her written informed consent 
to an abortion.”). 
 154. Id. at 872 (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. at 883; see also id. at 882 (“We also see no reason why the State may 
not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of 
materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those 
consequences have no direct relation to her health.”). 
 156. Id. at 884. 
 157. 430 U.S. 705 (1977); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (“To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights 
not to speak are implicated . . . .” (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 
(1977))). 
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the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their vehicle license 
plates.158 Without further discussion of Wooley, the Casey Court 
next, in the same sentence, turned to the state’s police power to 
subject the practice of medicine to “reasonable licensing and 
regulation.”159 For this proposition, the Court cited Whalen v. 
Roe,160 a case in which physicians and patients challenged a law 
that required prescription information to be reported to the 
state.161  
As commentators have observed, the juxtaposition of these 
two cases is odd and renders opaque the Court’s meaning.162 
Wooley is a First Amendment case establishing that laws 
requiring speakers to utter the state’s ideological viewpoint are 
constitutionally impermissible.163 Yet in discussing the 
physicians’ First Amendment claim, the Casey joint opinion 
referred not to the permissibility of mandating that phyisicians 
provide information conveying the state’s ideological opposition to 
abortion but only to the permissibility of requiring “information 
                                                                                                     
 158. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.  
 159. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. 
 160. 429 U.S. 589 (1977); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (observing that 
physicians’ First Amendment rights to speak must be analyzed “as part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State” 
(citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977))). 
 161. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591 (“The constitutional question presented is 
whether the State of New York may record, in a centralized computer file, the 
names and addresses of all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doctor’s 
prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a lawful and an unlawful 
market.”). 
 162. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and 
the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 773–74 
(1999) (“To fuse these two models in a shorthand formulation provides little 
indication of how to resolve any professional’s First Amendment claim other 
than the precise one at issue in Casey.”); Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech 
and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled 
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2355 (2013) (“Neither Wooley nor 
Whalen discusses the First Amendment rights of physicians, so these citations 
provide little illumination of the balance between the general First Amendment 
protections against compelled speech and the state’s power to regulate medical 
professionals.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment 
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 946 (“Exactly 
how the strict First Amendment standards of Wooley are meant to qualify the 
broad police power discretion of Whalen is left entirely obscure.”). 
 163. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). 
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about the risks of abortion, and childbirth.”164 The stronger First 
Amendment claim, that the state should not compel ideological 
speech or regulate speech based on its disagreement with the 
speaker’s viewpoint, was left unaddressed.165 
Whalen, on the other hand, is not about free speech at all. 
The Whalen plaintiffs had claimed that law violated the right to 
privacy, not the First Amendment.166 The Court in Whalen 
disagreed that the statute violated the plaintiffs’ rights to privacy 
of personal information and independence in making important 
personal decisions.167 Casey’s reliance on a privacy case to resolve 
physicians’ free speech claims sows confusion about the 
relationship, if any, between privacy claims and free speech 
claims against compelled disclosures in the abortion context. 
Nevertheless, as two federal district courts have observed, it 
seems unlikely that the authors of the Casey joint opinion 
intended to “analytically merge the First Amendment rights of 
doctors with the Fourteenth Amendment rights of women.”168 
                                                                                                     
 164. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(emphasis added); see also Keighley, supra note 162, at 2355–56 (“The risk 
information pointed to by the Court assuredly is the type of information that a 
physician already has a duty to give a patient in order to get that patient’s 
informed consent to the abortion procedure.”). 
 165. As discussed above, the joint opinion in Casey addressed the ideological 
information mandated by the Pennsylvania law only in the context of assessing 
whether it imposed an undue burden.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83. 
 166. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) (“The District Court 
enjoined enforcement of the portions of the New York State Controlled 
Substances Act of 1972 which require such recording on the ground that they 
violate appellees’ constitutionally protected rights of privacy.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 167. See id. at 602 (“[I]t is, of course, true that private information must be 
disclosed to the . . . New York Department of Health. Such disclosures, however, 
are not . . . meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant 
invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care.”). 
 168. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-
486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012); see also Stuart v. 
Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 1863, at *17 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014) 
(“Despite its brevity, [Casey’s] First Amendment analysis is clearly a traditional 
one . . . . Casey did not purport to carve out a new First Amendment exception or 
create a new standard of review for all abortion-related speech cases.”); cf. 
Keighley, supra note 162, at 2361–64 (arguing that Casey should not be read as 
endorsing the constitutionality under the First Amendment of requirements 
that abortion providers personally communicate to their patients—rather than 
merely make available in written form—the substance of a state’s ideological 
message). Indeed, given the minimal attention plaintiffs devoted to the First 
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Invoking Casey, some lower courts have applied a deferential 
standard to uphold abortion laws that—more obviously than in 
Casey—insert the state into a doctor’s relationship with her 
patient for ideological reasons.169 Some have done so by 
deliberately blurring the lines between the undue burden 
standard and First Amendment doctrine.170  
The Fifth Circuit has expressly interpreted Casey as 
tethering abortion providers’ free speech claims to the undue 
burden standard. In May 2011, Texas amended its abortion 
disclosure law to require that, before performing an abortion, 
physicians conduct and display a sonogram of the embryo or 
fetus, make audible the heartbeat for the woman to hear, and 
verbally explain to her the results of both procedures, including 
detailed descriptions of the fetus or embryo and a simultaneous 
verbal explanation of the heart auscultation.171 A woman may 
decline to view the images or hear the heartbeat, but in most 
circumstances she may not decline to receive an explanation of 
the sonogram images.172 No less than the anti-smoking messages 
in R.J. Reynolds, these requirements are an “unabashed 
attempt[] to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and 
browbeat” abortion patients into choosing childbirth over 
abortion.173 
                                                                                                     
Amendment issue in their briefs and at oral argument in Casey, it seems unwise 
to read too much into the Court’s brief free speech discussion. See Keighley, 
supra note 162, at 2357–61 (describing the limited focus on the free speech 
question in the Casey litigation). 
 169. See infra text accompanying notes 178–179 (discussing Planned 
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733–35 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc)). 
 170. See Corbin, supra note 2, at 1190–92 (“[Courts] dodge the doctors’ free 
speech claims by applying the Casey undue burden test . . . .”); Keighley, supra 
note 162, at 2349 (“[T]he Fifth Circuit recently set forth . . . that physicians 
retain virtually no First Amendment rights while they are practicing 
medicine. . . . This model . . . essentially collapses the First Amendment inquiry 
with Casey’s analysis of women’s substantive due process rights.”). 
 171. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2014). 
 172. See id. § 171.012(b)–(d) (providing that the required information be 
provided orally, that the web address on which the printed materials may be 
found be disclosed, and that it include the likelihood of obtaining child support). 
 173. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortions v. Lakey,174 
abortion providers challenged these restrictions on a variety of 
grounds, including that they unconstitutionally compel 
physicians to engage in government-mandated speech and that 
they violate abortion patients’ right not to speak by compelling 
them to certify the physician’s compliance with the procedures.175 
The plaintiffs did not challenge the requirements on undue 
burden grounds.176 The district court understood that the 
plaintiffs’ choice to challenge the requirements on compelled 
speech grounds meant the court could not simply evaluate the 
requirements based on Casey’s undue burden analysis of 
Pennsylvania’s mandated disclosure requirement: 
This Court quotes substantial portions of Casey[’s] [undue 
burden analysis of Pennsylvania’s mandated disclosure law] 
because Defendants rely heavily on [that] language in arguing 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge lacks merit. 
However, . . . the Supreme Court’s discussion is in the context 
of a constitutional challenge based upon a woman’s Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process right to an abortion, not a First 
Amendment challenge. Accordingly, while the Court’s 
statements may be instructive on the First Amendment issue, 
they are not dispositive.177 
In addressing plaintiffs’ compelled speech claim, the district 
court applied strict scrutiny.178 Finding the physician–patient 
dialog to be either noncommercial speech or mixed commercial 
and noncommercial speech, the court noted that, “[o]utside the 
commercial context, ‘content-based regulations of speech are 
presumptively invalid.’”179 The court then found that the new 
                                                                                                     
 174. 806 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
 175. See id. at 949 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ claims). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 971–72. 
 178. See id. at 970. 
 179. Id. at 969 (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188 
(2007)); see also Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 1863, at *10 
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (stating, in context of pre-abortion ultrasound speech 
and display requirement, that “[r]equiring a physician or other health care 
provider to deliver the state’s content-based, non-medical message in his or her 
own voice as if the message was his or her own constitutes compelled ideological 
speech and warrants the highest degree of First Amendment protection”). 
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Texas requirements violated the First Amendment rights of both 
abortion patients and their doctors.180 The court concluded: 
The net result of these provisions is: (1) a physician is required 
to say things and take expressive actions with which the 
physician may not ideologically agree, and which the physician 
may feel are medically unnecessary; (2) the pregnant woman 
must not only passively receive this potentially unwanted 
speech and expression, but must also actively participate—in 
the best case by simply signing an election form, and in the 
worst case by disclosing in writing extremely personal, 
medically irrelevant facts; and (3) the entire experience must 
be memorialized in records that are, at best, semi-private.181 
Unlike the district court, the Fifth Circuit in Lakey saw 
Casey’s undue burden analysis as inextricably linked to, and 
determinative of, compelled speech challenges to mandated 
disclosure laws in the abortion context.182 The Fifth Circuit panel 
relied not just on Casey but also on Gonzales v. Carhart,183 which 
stated that “the government may use its voice and its regulatory 
authority to show its profound respect for the life within the 
woman.”184 Gonzales did not involve any free speech challenge to 
the federal “partial-birth abortion” ban at issue there.185 But this 
did not matter to the Fifth Circuit, which made clear that it 
viewed the answer to the undue burden question as dispositive of 
the compelled speech claim: 
The import of these cases is clear. First, informed consent laws 
that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to 
have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful, 
nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws 
are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice 
                                                                                                     
 180. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 
2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (“[T]he Act compels physicians to advance an 
ideological agenda with which they may not agree . . . . Accordingly, the Court 
finds the Act’s compelled speech requirements . . . are unconstitutional 
violations of the First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.”), 
vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Stuart, 2014 WL 186310, 
at *20 (finding a similar law unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
 181. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 975. 
 182. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 183. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 184. Id. at 128. 
 185. See id. at 132–33 (summarizing the plaintiff’s claims). 
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and do not fall under the rubric of compelling “ideological” 
speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third, 
“relevant” informed consent may entail not only the physical 
and psychological risks to the expectant mother facing this 
“difficult moral decision,” but also the state’s legitimate 
interests in “protecting the potential life within her.”186 
The Fifth Circuit saw Casey’s undue burden standard not 
simply as relevant to the compelled speech question, but as 
displacing it. In the Fifth Circuit’s view, it is not possible for an 
abortion restriction to violate a constitutional right independent 
of a woman’s right to access abortion.187 Like the Sixth Circuit 
considering a bodily integrity claim in DeWine, the Fifth Circuit 
in Lakey viewed the doctors’ First Amendment claims with 
suspicion, as if the plaintiffs were somehow impermissibly 
seeking an end-run around the undue burden standard.188 The 
court labeled as an “omission” the plaintiffs’ failure to argue that 
the ultrasound requirements amounted to an undue burden, 
describing it as “significant.”189 The Fifth Circuit observed: “[I]f 
[the restrictions] would not violate the woman’s privacy right 
under the Casey plurality opinion, then Appellees would, by 
means of their First Amendment claim, essentially trump the 
balance Casey struck between women’s rights and the states’ 
prerogatives.”190 Thus, like the court in DeWine, the Fifth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
 186. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (emphases added). 
 187. The one exception to this appears to be vagueness, which the Fifth 
Circuit appears to view as independent of the undue burden standard. See supra 
note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s treatment of the 
void for vagueness claim in Lakey).  
 188. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-
CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2 n.6 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (“An early point 
of departure between this Court’s analysis and the [Fifth Circuit] panel’s is that 
this Court takes Plaintiffs’ claims at face value . . . whereas the panel 
apparently sees it as . . . about women’s right to an abortion—an issue 
specifically disclaimed by Plaintiffs in this suit.”). 
 189. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
577 (5th Cir. 2012). The district court questioned how such an omission could be 
“significant” if the plaintiffs were not even making an undue burden claim. See 
Lakey, 2012 WL 373132, at *3 (noting that “Plaintiffs may have failed to make 
such allegations precisely because they were bringing First Amendment 
challenges on behalf of doctors” and “[Plaintiffs]—like this Court— court were 
surprised by the panel’s apparent importation of a Fourteenth Amendment 
‘undue burden’ standard into their First Amendment compelled speech claims.”). 
 190. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577. 
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appears to view the undue burden standard as occupying the field 
of abortion regulation. Because these courts see the undue 
burden standard as striking a careful “balance” on the issue of 
abortion, they see any other claim that might invalidate an 
abortion restriction is seen as upsetting this balance.191 As 
discussed in Part II, this kind of “field preemption” is 
unprecedented in constitutional law.192 The federal district court 
in Lakey, on remand, accused the Fifth Circuit panel of 
“creat[ing] a special rule for informed consent for abortions” not 
supported by Casey.193 
The Eighth Circuit has come close to applying undue burden 
preemption to a compelled speech claim, albeit less obviously. In 
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds,194 the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, sitting en banc, refused to enjoin a requirement that 
abortion providers give a written statement to their patients 
asserting that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, 
separate, unique, living human being.”195 While the Eighth 
Circuit in Rounds did not as openly conflate the undue burden 
and First Amendment analyses as did the Fifth Circuit, its 
analysis still seems unlikely to be applied to any viewpoint-
discriminatory speech regulation other than a post-Casey 
abortion law. The problem is that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits 
interpret “truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a 
patient’s decision” to encompass not just information typical to 
ordinary medical informed consent requirements—such as the 
comparative medical risks of abortion and childbirth—but also 
“information” clearly mandated purely for ideological reasons.196 
                                                                                                     
 191. See id.; see also Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 549 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is not necessary to determine whether the classification should 
be deemed gender-neutral, because the interests at stake should be balanced by 
simply applying the Casey undue burden standard.”). 
 192. See supra Part II (discussing the prevailing approach of analyzing each 
constitutional claim separately according to each applicable doctrine); see also 
infra Part IV (critiquing undue burden preemption). 
 193. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-
486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). 
 194. 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 195. Id. at 735. 
 196. See, e.g., id. at 734–35 (“[T]he State . . . can use its regulatory authority 
to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant 
to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also 
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Indeed, in Rounds, the Eighth Circuit strained mightily to read 
the language at issue as non-ideological, interpreting it to mean 
simply that the embryo or fetus is biologically human, a fact that 
no woman of sound mind needs a doctor to tell her.197 Similarly, 
the Fifth Circuit in Lakey described ultrasound images as 
“surely . . . the purest conceivable expression of ‘factual 
information,’”198 although one wonders whether it would have 
seen the graphic anti-smoking photos in R.J. Reynolds in the 
same light.199  
Despite its confusing treatment of Pennsylvania’s mandated 
information law, Casey does not provide support for the idea that 
ideologically motivated disclosure requirements—such as those in 
Lakey and Rounds—do not violate the First Amendment. Casey 
did say that the state may express its preference for childbirth 
under the undue burden standard,200 but it omitted any mention 
of such ideologically motivated speech in its First Amendment 
discussion.201 The district court in Lakey saw through the game 
being played by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, saying of the Fifth 
Circuit panel decision: 
[T]he result is that doctors may permissibly be compelled to 
parrot anything the state deems necessary to further its 
“legitimate interests in protecting the potential life within” the 
pregnant woman, provided the message does not impose an 
undue burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion. That 
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 197. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Eighth Circuit to Pregnant Women: You’re 
Not Carrying a Dolphin!, REPROD. RIGHTS. PROF BLOG (June 27, 2008), 
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 198. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
577 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 199. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
court applied heightened scrutiny in R.J. Reynolds to strike down an FDA rule 
requiring graphic images on cigarette packaging because it “represent[ed] an 
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products”). 
 200. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).  
 201. Id.; supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
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is, within the abortion context, the doctor’s right to speak, or 
not to speak, is wholly dependent on the contours of a woman’s 
right to an abortion. . . . [T]his Court is concerned with the 
panel’s implicit conflation of “reasonable regulation of medical 
practice,” with “truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant 
disclosures”—particularly given the panel’s broad definition of 
“relevant” in this context. As this Court reads the panel’s 
opinion, an extended presentation, consisting of graphic 
images of aborted fetuses, and heartfelt testimonials about the 
horrors of abortion, would be “truthful, nonmisleading, and 
relevant.” Accordingly, the government could apparently 
require doctors personally to make such presentations prior to 
performing abortions . . . .202 
Courts should recognize that compelled speech claims address a 
very different interest than whether a woman’s right to access 
abortion has been unduly burdened. There is no reason why 
ordinary First Amendment doctrine should not apply to these 
claims. Under that doctrine, viewpoint discriminatory, 
mandatory abortion disclosures should be assessed under strict 
scrutiny. 
IV. A Critique of Undue Burden Preemption 
The undue burden standard makes sense only as an inquiry 
that focuses on access to abortion. The Supreme Court in Casey 
specifically described Roe’s “essential holding” as establishing 
“the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before 
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the 
State.”203 The Court then went on to modify this standard to 
allow more restrictions on abortion access, so long as these were 
not unduly burdensome.204 The undue burden standard expressly 
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 203. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added). 
 204. See id. at 878. 
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looks at whether a law has the “purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion.”205 It therefore makes sense to apply the undue burden 
standard only to assertions that a law burdens, limits, or bars 
women’s access to abortion.  
Abortion restrictions, however, often go beyond limiting 
access to abortion, implicating other distinct rights. The fact that 
an ultrasound law compels a physician to communicate certain 
information to a patient implicates the physician’s First 
Amendment rights irrespective of whether the law affects 
women’s ability to obtain abortions. That same law also 
implicates a woman’s bodily integrity, by forcing her to undergo a 
procedure ranging from somewhat to intensely intrusive, 
depending on the type of sonogram performed.206 Like the doctor’s 
compelled speech claim, the woman’s bodily intrusion claim exists 
independently of whether the requirement hampers or prevents 
her access to abortion. Even if abortion remains freely available 
and is no more expensive than before, her bodily integrity has 
been violated.  
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s prevailing approach 
to constitutional adjudication recognizes that a single claim may 
implicate more than one constitutional provision.207 In United 
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, the Court recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment did not preempt the Fifth 
Amendment due process claim raised there because the claims 
were not interchangeable.208 The same principle holds true in the 
abortion context. Undue burden preemption allows the undue 
burden standard to gobble up, Pac-Man-like, wholly distinct 
constitutional claims that assert interests different from abortion 
access and sometimes even the interests of people other than 
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 208. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52 (1993) 
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abortion patients. There is nothing in Casey that justifies such an 
alarming expansion of the undue burden standard. Indeed, by 
separately analyzing the (tentatively argued) free speech claims 
raised in Casey,209 the Court clearly regarded these claims as 
distinct, confusing though its discussion may have been. 
The Graham doctrine—which allows certain constitutional 
claims to displace substantive due process claims—likewise does 
not support undue burden preemption.210 In fact, undue burden 
preemption turns the Graham doctrine on its head. Under 
Graham, courts avoid applying substantive due process, the very 
source of the right to abortion protected by the undue burden 
standard.211 If Graham is justified—which itself is 
questionable212—it is on the grounds that substantive due process 
is not grounded in explicit constitutional text and therefore lacks 
sufficient guideposts for courts.213 The Court at least plausibly 
claims to prefer to analyze governmental action under an express 
constitutional provision, where that provision clearly applies.214 
In such cases, the Court purports to apply an analysis that it 
views as more or less interchangeable with (albeit more specific 
than) the substantive due process claim.215 
These justifications do not apply to undue burden 
preemption. First, Graham’s impulse to avoid wading into the 
uncharted waters of substantive due process cannot possibly 
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justify allowing a substantive due process claim to preempt any 
other constitutional claim. In an about-face from Graham, undue 
burden preemption has been applied to allow an unenumerated, 
substantive due process right—the right to abortion—to displace 
the textually explicit rights of equal protection and freedom of 
speech. As to bodily integrity, which is also unenumerated, there 
is still no reason one can draw from Graham for concluding that 
one substantive due process right preempts another. Second, in 
the cases in which courts have applied undue burden preemption, 
the preempted claims were not interchangeable with undue 
burden claims. As discussed above, each raised distinct concerns 
having nothing to do with whether a woman could access 
abortion.216 Thus, under the sole exception to the prevailing 
approach, undue burden preemption is still indefensible. 
V. Conclusion 
Abortion has been wrongly subjected to special, disfavored 
treatment in many areas of the law. Most obviously, in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme 
Court jettisoned strict scrutiny for a new constitutional test, 
custom made for abortion restrictions. This test opened the door 
for state legislatures’ exceptional treatment of abortion, as they 
have piled on restrictions not applied to other medical 
procedures. Undue burden preemption, however, goes a step 
beyond this by interpreting the undue burden standard as 
preempting wholly unrelated constitutional claims. It thus 
effectively eliminates valid claims against abortion restrictions 
that are not about access—the issue for which the undue burden 
standard was clearly designed. 
In other contexts, courts analyze separate constitutional 
rights claims individually, under the respective rules applicable 
to each claim. The only recognized exception to this rule—the 
Graham doctrine—further casts doubt on the legitimacy of undue 
burden exceptionalism. Under the Graham doctrine, courts 
displace substantive due process claims when a more specific 
constitutional provision also applies. In these cases, both claims 
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are essentially duplicative, and the court eschews the doctrinal 
approach considered more amorphous and judicially 
precarious. Undue burden preemption turns this concept upside 
down. Courts abandon well-established tests—even under 
textually explicit provisions such as the First Amendment or the 
Equal Protection Clause—for the infamously nebulous undue 
burden standard. Undue burden preemption cannot be explained 
as anything other than a bald attempt to limit the constitutional 
avenues claimants may use to challenge abortion restrictions. It 
will be up to the Supreme Court to recognize and stop this trend. 
  
